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Abstract. In company law, there is a basic principle that the company is an 
autonomous legal entity and independent from other subjects of law. In the 
relationship of the parent company and the subsidiaries, we can fi nd two 
perspectives:
– on the one hand, an economic perspective: the separate corporations 
constitute one enterprise (the subsidiaries are or can be instructed/directed 
by the parent company), the group of corporations is a unitary business entity;
– on the other hand, a legal perspective: the coherence and the confl ict 
among the interest of the parent company, the interest of the subsidiaries, 
and the interest of the group.1
Keywords: parent company, subsidiaries, group of corporations, group 
interest, concern law
I. Fundamental and General Statements 
in Connection with the Hungarian Group of Corporations
In Hungary, the law of groups of corporations is a special fi eld of company law, 
but also regulated by the Capital Market Act.2 The concern: a participant of the 
economic life acquires infl uence concerning the mechanism of decision-making 
in the limited liability company, stock company, grouping and cooperative society 
registered in the Firm Registry and operated independently; as a result of that, 
the companies/associations keep their legal independence, but they constitute 
1 Conac 2013. 195, 215.
2 CXX of 2001.
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an economic unit. Within the law of groups of corporations, we can separate 
the recognized (qualifi ed) concern and the de facto (actual/real) concern.3 
The recognized concern is based on a contractual relationship, on a control 
contract. The de facto concern is founded on the fact of infl uence acquisition, 
without concluding a contract.4
The essence of infl uence5 can be:
– a ‘voting concern’, where a member acquires the determined percentage of 
votes and exercises his/her voting rights,6 or
– the right to appoint, to recall, and to establish the remuneration of the 
executive offi cers and members of the supervisory board, or
– other way which provides decisive direction and checking for the controlling 
company above the operation of the controlled company.7
There are two points of view in Hungary in connection with the foundation of 
concern situation:
– a concern situation comes into existence only when the acquisition of share 
is based on a legal transaction (on privity), but not on a legal fact (for example, 
inheritance), and not on the oragnizational amendment (for example, merger);8
3 For details, see: Vecsey 2013. 736–745.
4 Papp 2014. 449.
5 Act V of 2013 Section 8:2 Infl uence:
 (1)  majority control means a relationship where a natural or legal person (holder of a participating 
interest) controls over 50% of the voting rights in a legal person, or in which it has a dominant 
infl uence.
 (2)  The holder of a participating interest is deemed to have dominant infl uence on a legal person 
if it is a member of or shareholder in that company and:
  a)  it has the right to appoint and recall the majority of the executive offi cers or supervisory 
board members of the legal person; or
  b)  other members of or shareholder in that legal person are committed under agreement with 
the holder of a participating interest to vote in concert with the holder of a participating 
interest, or they exercise their voting rights through the holder of a participating interest, 
provided that together they control more than half of the votes.
 (3)  Majority control is also deemed to exist if the entitlements referred to in subsections 1–2 are 
provided indirectly for the holder of a participating interest.
 (4)  Indirect control on a legal person means a relationship where a person is able to exercise 
infl uence on a legal person that has voting rights in that legal person (intermediary legal person). 
The scope of indirect control means the percentage of control held by the intermediary legal 
person, which corresponds to the percentage of control the holder of a participating interest 
has in the intermediary legal person. If the holder of a participating interest controls more than 
half of the votes in the intermediary legal person, the control the intermediary legal person has 
in the legal person shall be taken into account in its entirety as indirect control held by the 
holder of a participating interest.
 (5)  The direct and indirect ownership interest and voting rights of close relatives shall be 
applied contemporaneously.
6 BDT 2002. 173 (Casebook of the Courts).
7 Papp 2014. 449.
8 Vezekényi 2002. 11.
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– according to the other opinion, there is no importance of the legal title of the 
acquisition, the legal grounds can be ipso iure or succesion.9
The acquisition of infl uence is not equivalent to the acquisition of share it 
can be established by facts of both company law and private law.10 The fact and 
the measure of infl uence adjust to the proportion of votes; it can be reached by 
a determined percentage of votes or by share with priority voting rights or by 
establishment of usufruct on the other members’ shares or if the other members 
have shares with priority rights but without voting rights.11
The subjects of the concern situation are the controlling/parent company and 
the controlled companies/subsidiaries. A group of corporations may consist 
of stock companies, limited liability companies, groupings, and cooperative 
societies.12 If a group of corporations is led jointly by several legal persons, they 
shall enter into an agreement to determine the one enabled to exercise the rights 
of the dominant member in accordance with the control contract.13
The concern law regulates only the acquisition of infl uence in existing companies, 
it is irrelevant to the infl uence originating at the timepoint of the foundation of 
companies.14 The regulation of concern law is divided into two parts: the rules of 
process and legal effect of acquisition of infl uence (general and dynamic regulation 
of concern law) and the provisions for special rights and duties connecting with 
the existing infl uence (particular regulation of concern law).15
The recognized group of corporations means a form of featuring a common 
business strategy among at least one dominant member that is required to draw 
up consolidated annual accounts and at least three members controlled by the 
dominant member under a control contract.16 By reason of this, the conjunctive 
conditions in order to establish the recognized group of corporations are the 
following: at least one controlling member (with commitment to draw up 
consolidated annual accounts), at least – permanently – three members controlled 
by the parent company, and these members conclude a control contract (for 
lack of the control contract, the recognized group of corporations cannot be 
presumptive)17 based on a common business strategy. The recognized group of 
corporations is neither a legal entity nor a legal person,18 and per se the owner 
relation cannot justify the existence of concern (holding company).19
  9 LB Gfv. XX. 31654/200/5; LB Gf. I. 32620/2000/10 (Decisions of the Supreme Court).
10 Papp 2014. 539.
11 Auer, Bakos, Buzás, Farkas, Nótári, Papp T. 2011. 539.
12 Section 3:49 (2) of Act V of 2013 (Hungarian Civil Code; hereafter abbreviated: CC).
13 Section 3:49 (3) of CC.
14 Papp 2014. 540.
15 Papp 2014. 540.
16 Section 3:49 (1) of CC; Miskolczi-Bodnár 2014. 148–150.
17 FÍT 4. Kf. 27.538/2010/5 (Decision of the High Court of Appeal).
18 Papp 2014. 449; FÍT 2. Pf. 21.729/2010/4 (Decision of the High Court of Appeal).
19 Curia Kfv. VI. 37.376/2011/8.
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II. The Group Interest
By means of exercising infl uence, the controlling company can enforce its interests 
during the operation of the group of corporations. Through it, the interest-identity 
between the dominant member and the company can be adversely affected, the 
interest of the controlling member does not necessarily suit the object of the 
company. One of the duties of concern law is to balance the confl ict of interests 
between the parent company and the subsidiaries,20 as the exercising of infl uence 
concerns the minority of the controlled companies and also their creditors.21
This confl ict of interests (concern confl ict) between the dominant member 
and the company is legally legitimate, and the ‘Treupfl icht’ is effective only in 
the de facto concern.22 The subsidiaries are operating under unifi ed direction 
(in economic sense) and typically according to the interests of the dominant 
member.23 The dominant member subordinates the controlled companies to 
its business interests in return for adequate compensation of detriments.24 
The interests of the group of corporations are primary until the subsidiaries (and 
their stakeholders: members and creditors) can proportionally share in the benefi ts 
of the concern situation and also in the fair dividing of the disadvantages of the 
group of corporations.25 It means that in the recognized group of corporations the 
dominant member cannot instruct unlimitedly the management of the controlled 
companies, and the concern situation does not grant exemption from the liability 
of the controlled companies’ directors for detriments caused by the execution of 
the dominant member’s decisions.26 Tamás Sárközy is of the opinion that:
– the necessary minimum of the autonomy shall be provided for subsidiaries;
– the subsidiaries’ management can be instructed only for the reason and to 
the extent of the performance of the business political conception of the group of 
corporations.27
The recognized group of corporations comes into existence by concluding the 
control contract (Beherrschungsvertrag, dominating agreement). If only the 
dominant member holds any share in the controlled member of a group of 
corporations, no control contract is required; instead, the mandatory layout of 
the control contract shall be provided for in the instrument of constitution of the 
dominant member and the controlled member.28 The control contract lays down 
20 Papp 2014. 538.
21 Papp 2014. 540.
22 Darázs 2003. 168.
23 Darázs 2003. 169.
24 Darázs 2003. 182.
25 Gadó 2004. 4.
26 Gadó 2004. 4, Darázs 2003. 175.
27 Sárközy 2003. 31, Gadó 2004. 4.
28 Section 3:54 of CC.
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the common business strategy for a group of corporations.29 The control contract 
shall, inter alia, contain the following:
– the corporate names and registered offi ces of the dominant member and the 
controlled members;
– the mode of cooperation within the group, including the key aspects;
– an indication as to whether the group of corporation is established for a 
limited period of time or for an indefi nite duration.30
The autonomy of the controlled companies may be restricted in the manner and 
to the extent specifi ed in the control contract with a view to achieving the common 
business objective31 or the fulfi lment of the aim of the group of corporations as 
a whole.32 The control contract shall provide for the protection of the rights of 
the controlled members and for the protection of creditors’ interests.33 The general 
provisions pertaining to contracts shall also apply to control contract.34 The control 
contract restricts the economic independence of the controlled companies and 
makes possible to realize a unifi ed business conception; the members are acting in 
the interests of the concern.35
In my opinion, the recognition of the group interest can be realized through the 
content of the control contract and by the determination of the common business 
strategy. As far as I can see, the common business strategy is not the same as the 
group interest, the latter being a narrower category: the common business strategy 
includes the group interest as well, but even more than that (see: business plans, 
fi nancial reports, budget, business conceptions, organizational relations, etc.). 
The group’s common business strategy is an ‘action programme’: the establishment 
and planning of the strategic and market transactions for a long period, the 
development of the economic and management conception, drafting the business 
principles and goals, etc.36 The recognition of the group interest is tangentially 
expressed in the Hungarian Civil Code in connection with the liability of the 
subsidiaries’ executive offi cers: the executive offi cer of a controlled member shall 
manage the controlled member in accordance with the control contract, under the 
governance of the dominant member, based on the primacy of the business policy 
of the group of corporations as a whole; the executive offi cer shall be exempt from 
liability to members if his conduct is found to be in compliance with provisions set 
out in the relevant legislation and in the control contract.37
29 Section 3:50 (1) of CC.
30 Section 3:50 (2) of CC.
31 Section 3:50 (3) of CC.
32 FÍT 2. Pf. 21.729/2010/4 (Decision of the High Court of Appeal).
33 Section 3:50 (3) of CC.
34 Section 3:50 (4) of CC.
35 Darázs 2003. 175.
36 ÍH 2005. 34 (Decision of the High Court of Appeal), Vecsey 2013. 734.
37 Section 3:55 (4) of CC.
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The management of the dominant member shall have the right to give 
instructions to the management of the controlled member as specifi ed in the 
control contract, and to issue binding resolutions relating to the controlled 
member’s operations. If the dominant member’s actions are in compliance 
with the control contract, the provisions of the Civil Code pertaining to the 
supreme body’s exclusive jurisdiction and to management autonomy shall not 
apply to the controlled member.38 The executive offi cers and supervisory board 
members of the dominant member may also serve at the controlled member as 
executive offi cers and supervisory board members.39 In single-member business 
associations, the sole member may instruct the management, which the executive 
offi cer is required to carry out.40 These consequently result that the group interest 
is equal to the interest of the dominant member.
Inside of the group of corporations, there can be a cost-sharing based on an 
agreement for refunding of expenses – this is familiar at the R&D (Research and 
Development) fi rms.41
III.  Safeguards Contrary to the Parent Company 
in Concern Law
1. Transparency
The dominant member shall make a public announcement on the formation 
of the group of corporations within 8 days after gaining knowledge of the last 
decision on the approval of the control contract on two occasions, at least 30 
days apart.42 The public announcement shall contain the control contract and a 
notice addressed to the creditors and shareholders of the controlled members.43 
The management of the dominant member shall submit an application to the 
Court of Registry for the registration of the group of corporations within 60 days 
after gaining knowledge of the last approval of the control contract;44 and the fi rm 
registry is authentic and public. After the registration, the provisions relating to 
38 Section 3:55 (1) of CC.
39 Section 3:55 (3) of CC.
40 Section 3:112 (3) of CC.
41 LB Kfv. I. 35.550/2008/5 (Decision of the Supreme Court), Fővárosi Bíróság 16. K. 31.115/2007/8 
(Decision of the Budapest City Court).
42 Section 3:51 (3) of CC.
43 Section 3:51 (4) of CC.
44 Section 3:51 (5) of CC.
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members with a qualifying holding shall not apply to the group of corporations 
and its members.45
2. The Buyout Right of the Subsidiaries’ Members
The members of a controlled company that participates in a group of corporations 
may request within a 30-day preclusive period following the second publication 
of the notice on the formation of the group of corporations that their shares be 
purchased by the dominant member at the market value prevailing at the time 
of publication of the announcement.46 A group of corporations may be registered 
if all rightful claims of the members of the controlled legal persons have been 
satisfi ed or if the court has dismissed the request of the members in a legal action 
brought to that effect.47
3. The Rights of the Subsidiaries’ Creditors
If a creditor lays any claim to a controlled member participating in the group of 
corporations at the time of the fi rst publication of the announcement, the creditor may 
demand adequate safeguards from the controlled member within a 30-day preclusive 
period following the second publication of the announcement.48 Any creditor whose 
claim is already guaranteed – pursuant to statutory provision or contract – shall not 
be entitled to demand such safeguards, including if it is not justifi ed in the light of 
the controlled member’s fi nancial standing or of the contents of the control contract.49 
45 Section 3:53 of CC, Section 3:324 of CC: Extra commitments of members with a qualifying 
holding:
 (1)  Where a member of a limited liability company or a shareholder of a private company limited 
by shares – directly or indirectly – controls at least 3/4 of the votes, the Court of Registry shall 
be notifi ed thereof within 15 days from the time of acquisition of such qualifying holding for 
the purpose of registration and publication.
 (2)  Within a 60-day preclusive period reckoned from the date of notifi cation of the acquisition of 
a qualifying holding, any member (shareholder) of the company may request that his shares 
be purchased by the owner of the qualifying holding. The owner of a qualifying holding 
must purchase such shares at the market value prevailing at the time when the request 
was submitted, which value may not be lower than the value the shares represent in the 
company’s own capital.
 (3)  If the company is dissolved without succession, at the request of the creditors, the owner of 
the qualifying holding shall cover any claim for which no satisfaction had been provided, 
provided that the dissolution without succession was brought about in consequence of 
the poor business decisions of the owner of the qualifying holding. This provision is not 
applicable in the case where the company is wound up without going into liquidation.
46 Section 3:52 (1) of CC; BH 2006. 91 (Court Order); SZIT-H-Gf-2009-78 (Decision of the High 
Court of Appeal of Szeged).
47 Section 3:52 (3) of CC.
48 Section 3:52 (2) of CC.
49 Section 3:52 (2) of CC.
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A group of corporations may be registered if all rightful claims of the creditors of the 
controlled legal persons have been satisfi ed or if the court has dismissed the request 
of the creditors in a legal action brought to that effect.50
Any creditor of the controlled member whose claim reaches 10% of the 
controlled member’s subscribed capital may request the management of the 
dominant member to provide information on the implementation of the control 
contract, and on the controlled member’s fi nancial standing. If the management 
of the dominant member fails to comply with the request or if the information 
supplied is insuffi cient, the creditor may request the Court of Registry to 
adjudicate that the dominant member is in breach of the control contract.51
4. Protection of the Minority Stakeholders
A group of members controlling at least 5% of the voting rights in the controlled 
company and the executive offi cers of the controlled company may request 
that the supreme body of the dominant member be convened if they notice any 
substantive or repeated breach of the control contract. If the management of the 
dominant member fails to comply with such a request within 15 days from the 
date of receipt, and fails to convene the meeting of the supreme body within 30 
days, the Court of Registry shall convene the meeting of the supreme body at the 
request of the members making the proposal or shall empower the requesting 
members to convene the meeting within the prescribed deadline. The costs of the 
meeting shall be advanced by the dominant member; however, if the request is 
found unsubstantiated, the costs shall be borne by the requesting parties.52
5. Employee Participation
If employee participation in the supervisory board is mandatory in at least three 
controlled members of a registered group of corporations, the supreme body of the 
dominant member may permit, if so requested by the work councils concerned, 
that the representatives of employees participate in the supervisory board of the 
dominant member instead of the supervisory bodies of the controlled members. In 
that case, the instrument of constitution of the dominant member shall provide for the 
setting up of a supervisory board if the given member did not have one. The mode of 
delegation of the representatives of employees in that case shall be regulated by way 
of an agreement (under the general provisions for contracts) among the management 
of the dominant member and the work councils of the controlled members affected.53
50 Section 3:52 (3) of CC.
51 Section 3:56 (2) of CC.
52 Section 3:57 of CC.
53 Section 3:58 of CC.
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6.  Regulation of the Relations between the Management 
of the Dominant Member and the Controlled Member
The management of the dominant member shall have the right to give instructions 
to the management of the controlled member as specifi ed in the control contract, 
and to issue binding resolutions relating to the controlled member’s operation. If 
the dominant member’s actions are in compliance with the control contract, the 
provisions of the Civil Code pertaining to the supreme body’s exclusive jurisdiction 
and to management autonomy shall not apply to the controlled member.54
If the control contract provides facilities to delegate competence upon the 
dominant member for the election and recall of the controlled member’s executive 
offi cers and supervisory board members, and for determining their remuneration, 
an employee of the dominant member may be appointed as director of the 
controlled company.55
The executive offi cers and supervisory board members of the dominant member 
may also serve at the controlled member as executive offi cers and supervisory 
board members.56
The management of both the dominant member and the controlled member 
shall report to their supreme body at the intervals fi xed in the control contract, 
but at least once a year on the fulfi lment of the objectives set out in the control 
contract. Any provision of the control contract providing for a less frequent 
reporting obligation shall be null and void.57
7. Measures of the Court of Registry
In the event of any major or repeated breach of the control contract, the Court of 
Registry shall, upon request by either of the parties with legal interest:
– call on the dominant member to abide by the control contract;
– introduce supervisory measures;
– dissolve the group of corporations.58
Besides the safeguards contrary to the controlling company in the concern law, 
other measures can be found in the Hungarian company law for protection of the 
subsidiaries – non-exhaustive list:
– the information right of the controlled member;59
54 Section 3:55 (1) of CC.
55 Section 3:55 (2) of CC.
56 Section 3:55 (3) of CC.
57 Section 3:56 (1) of CC.
58 Section 3:60 of CC.
59 Section 3:23 of CC: Confi dentiality and obligation of information:
 (1)  The executive offi cer is required to keep the members of the legal person informed concerning 
the legal person, and to provide access for them to the legal person’s documents, records, 
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– the prohibition of voting during the passing resolution;60
– the liability for the legal person’s debts (transfer of liability, Übergang der 
Haftung);61
– the piercing of the corporate veil (Haftungsdurchgriff);62
– the wrongful trading,63 but this provision in the Civil Code does not accord 
with other relevant rules (§ 118/B in Firm Act and § 33/A in Bankruptcy Act) and 
with the provision on the liability of the subsidiaries’ executive offi cers (Section 
3:55 (4) of Civil Code);
– the safeguards for the lawful operation of the legal person (the judicial oversight 
of the Court of Registry,64 the judicial review of the resolution of legal person by 
court,65 the protection of minority stakeholders,66 the arbitration proceeding, 67 etc.).
and registers. The executive offi cer shall be entitled to request a written declaration of 
confi dentiality before the provision of information or access.
 (2)  The executive offi cer may refuse to give information and to provide access to documents if this 
would infringe upon the legal person’s trade secrets, if the requesting party exercises his right in 
a manner which is abusive, or if he refuses to make a declaration of confi dentiality despite having 
been asked to do so. If the requesting party considers the refusal of information unjustifi ed, he 
may request the Court of Registry to order the legal person to provide access to the information.
60 Section 3:19 (2) of CC: Passing resolution:
 (2)  In the process adopting a resolution the following persons may not vote:
  a) any person for whom the resolution contains an exemption from any obligation or 
responsibility, or for whom any advantage is to be provided by the legal person;
  b) any person with whom an agreement is to be concluded according to the resolution;
  c) any person against whom legal proceedings are to be initiated according to the resolution;
  d)  any person whose family member has a vested interest in the decision, who is not a 
member or founder of the legal person;
  e) any person who maintains any relation on the basis of majority control with an 
organization that has a vested interest in the decision; or
  f) any person who himself has a vested interest in the decision.
61 Section 3:2 (2) of CC: Liability for the legal person’s debts:
 (2)  In the event of abuse of limited liability on the part of any member of a legal person, on 
account of which any outstanding creditors’ claims remain unsatisfi ed at the time of the 
legal person’s dissolution without succession, the member in question shall be subject to 
unlimited liability for such debts.
62 Section 6:540 of CC: Liability for the acts of members of legal persons:
 (2)  If a member of a legal person causes damage to a third party in connection with his 
membership, liability in relation to the injured person lies with the legal person.
 (3)  Liability of the member and the legal person shall be joint and several if the damage was 
caused intentionally.
63 Section 3:118 of CC: Liability of executive offi cers in respect of third parties:
 In the event of a business association’s dissolution without succession, creditors may bring action for 
damages up to their claims outstanding against the company’s executive offi cers on the grounds of 
non-contractual liability, should the executive offi cer affected fail to take the creditors’ interests into 
account in the event of an imminent threat to the business association’s solvency. This provision is 
not applicable in the case where the company is wound up without going into liquidation.
64 Section 3:34 of CC; §§ 72–91 of Firm Act.
65 Sections 3:35–3:37 of CC.
66 Sections 3:103-3:106 of CC.
67 Section 3:92 of CC.
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IV.  The Disadvantageous Group’s Common Business 
Strategy and the Types of Liability
If any controlled member of the group is undergoing liquidation, the dominant 
member shall be held liable for any debt the member may have outstanding; the 
dominant member shall be relieved of liability if able to verify that the controlled 
member’s insolvency did not arise as a consequence of the group’s common 
business strategy68 (secondary, unlimited liability).69 The instruction right of the 
dominant member and its result, the dependent situation of the controlled member 
is the reason for the liability of the dominant member.70 A casual relation must be 
between the disadvantageous group’s common business strategy and the insolvency 
of the controlled member: the business policy of the group of corporations caused 
the detriment (reduction of the assets) of the controlled member; the liability of the 
dominant member following each other is not joint and several.71
We have to take into account the disadvantageous common business strategy 
from the aspect of the controlled member and have to examine the activity of the 
dominant member.72 
The continuation of the disadvantageous common business strategy shall be 
qualifi ed as wilful, intentional, and seriously actionable conduct.73
The loan/credit and its partial ceasing by the dominant member to the 
controlled member, the attempt to sell the share of the dominant member, the 
single disadvantageous activity of the dominant member, the entering into loss-
making contracts by the dominant member, and the infringement of the rules 
of the accounting act by the dominant member do not base the establishment 
of the continuation of the disadvantageous common business strategy by the 
dominant member on the Hungarian jurisdiction.74 If the origin of the detriments 
of the controlled member can be traced back to objective economic processes 
and changes, and therefore the termination of the loss-making subsidiary by the 
dominant member is a rational owner’s decision, then it cannot be considered as 
the base of the liability of the dominant member.75 If both the dominant member 
and the controlled member have losses in consequence of a bad business decision, 
then it does not mean a disadvantageous common business strategy; the overall 
68 Section 3:59 of CC; BH 2007.418; BH 2005. 187 (Court Orders).
69 ÍH 2006. 123; ÍH 2006. 77 (Decisions of the High Court of Appeal).
70 ÍH 2004. 36 (Decision of the High Court of Appeal).
71 2013. P.4 (Decision of the Curia).
72 BH 2008. 91 (Court Order); Török 2009. 181.
73 Török 2009. 181.
74 BH 2008. 91 (Court Order).
75 EBH 2005. 1228 (Decision of the Supreme Court).
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effect exercised by particular harms is authoritative for the establishment of the 
disadvantageous common business strategy.76
If the business decisions of the dominant member cause losses to the controlled 
member, and the advantages and disadvantages of these decisions are balanced 
within the concern, this conduct of the dominant member establishes the liability 
of the parent company for the continuation of disadvantageous common business 
strategy.77 The disadvantageous common business strategy can be realized by the 
negligence of the dominant member,78 by its inactive conduct (no compensation of 
the subsidiary’s loss, no reduction of the capital of the controlled member, no money 
for the maintenance of the subsidiary’s real estates) in that interest of reaching own 
economic aims.79 This decision of the Hungarian Curia is a controversial question 
in Hungarian legal literature:80 the legal ground of the liability of the dominant 
member can be a negligence, but only then, when this negligence is an infringement 
of the rules of law or of the instrument of constitution; otherwise, the Curia gives 
priority to the creditors’ protection against the owner’s interest.
We can also fi nd a provision for the responsibility of the controlling company 
in the act on bankruptcy proceedings and liquidation proceedings, and it is not 
quite harmonious with the regulation in the Hungarian Civil Code.81 In respect 
of the liquidation of a company under control by qualifi ed majority, a single-
member company or a sole proprietorship, the controlling party or the sole member 
(shareholder) shall be responsible without limitation for the company’s liabilities 
which are not covered by the debtor’s assets during the liquidation proceedings, 
if the court has established the unlimited and full liability of such member 
(shareholder) for the company’s debts pursuant to a claim fi led by the creditor 
during the liquidation proceedings or within a 90-day preclusive period following 
the time of publication in the Cégközlöny (Firm Gazette) of the resolution on the fi nal 
conclusion of liquidation proceedings, on account of such member (shareholder) 
having had a permanent disadvantageous business strategy from the standpoint of 
the debtor company.82 The content of the statements of facts in Civil Code and in 
Bankruptcy Act is different:
– the dominant member controls over 75% or 100% of the voting rights in the 
controlled member on the ground of the Bankruptcy Act;
– the liability of the parent company is valid under liquidation in the Bankruptcy 
Act and after liquidation in the Civil Code;
76 ÍH 2006. 126 (Decision of the High Court of Appeal).
77 EBH 2004. 1038 (Decision of the Supreme Court); Winner (ed.) op. cit. 734.
78 BDT 2012. 2645 (Casebook of the Courts); Nochta 2014. 238.
79 Kúria Gfv. X. 30.082/2012 (Decision of the Curia).
80 Szegedi 2013 26–30.
81 Act XLIX of 1991 Section § 63 (2).
82 Winner (ed.) 2013, 788–789.
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– for claims, there is a preclusive period in the Bankruptcy Act, but the general 
term of limitation is to be found in the Civil Code;
– the condition ‘permanent’ is required in the Bankruptcy Act, and not in the 
Civil Code in connection with the continuation of the disadvantageous common 
business strategy;
– the dominant member is liable for any debt of the controlled member which 
remained unsatisfi ed by the subsidiary’s assets in accordance with the Civil Code, 
but as to Bankruptcy Act the controlling company is liable only for such debts 
which were claimed by the creditors during the liquidation process or within a 
preclusive deadline;
– the provision of the Civil Code emphasizes the causal relation between the 
liquidation of the controlled member and the common business strategy.
The act on public fi rm information, fi rm registry, and winding-up proceedings 
also mentions the liability of the dominant member.83 If the Court of Registry 
removed a fi rm with member’s limited liability from the fi rm register by way of 
involuntary de-registration procedure, the fi rm’s former member – registered at 
the time of de-registration – shall bear unlimited liability for the outstanding 
claims of the fi rm’s creditors, if found to have abused his limited liability. 
A member is considered to have abused his limited liability if having had a 
permanent disadvantageous business strategy or who disposed of the fi rm’s assets 
as his own or who supported a resolution, in respect of which he knew, or should 
have known given reasonable care that such resolution was clearly contrary to 
the signifi cant interests of the fi rm. Here there are also differences between the 
contents of the statements of facts in Civil Code and Firm Act:
– the rule in the Firm Act can be applied only to the member of the limited 
liability company, for the shareholder and for the member of the cooperative, 
but not for the member of a grouping (where the member has secondary and 
unlimited liability); opposite to this, the regulation in the Civil Code refers to all 
legal entities in concern law;
– the condition ‘permanent’ is required in the Firm Act, and not in the Civil 
Code in connection with the continuation of the disadvantageous common 
business strategy;
– the continuation of the disadvantageous common business strategy is 
identical with the abuse of a member’s limited liability in the Firm Act;
– the liability of the dominant member can be established only after the 
involuntary de-registration procedure according to the Firm Act;
– the provision of the Civil Code underlines the causal relation between the 
liquidation of the controlled member and the common business strategy.
83 Act V of 2006 §§ 118/A (1), (2)
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After this short overview, I can point out that in Hungary there is no recognition 
of group interest (neither in regulation nor in the articles of association). From 
the aspect of group interest, there cannot be found any difference between private 
and public company or between wholly-owned subsidiaries and others. In 
Hungarian single-member companies, management must follow the instructions 
by the parent company, and there are no provisions for the management of 
controlled members to obey the unlawful instructions of the dominant member. 
Therefore, I reckon that it is necessary to clarify the concept of group interest, and 
on its ground the relation among parent company and subsidiaries (for example: 
according to the instruction right of the controlling company) in Hungary, but also 
at the EU level, in order to provide a ‘safe harbour’ for managers of controlling 
and controlled companies against civil and criminal liability.
V. The Group Interest in Public Companies in Hungary
At the examination of the group interest from a corporate law perspective, the 
category of publicly owned economic companies (public companies) forms a 
specifi c fi eld. Although corporate law, as a universal fi eld, sets the directive to 
all sectors as background law,84 and the specifi c prescriptions of law directive 
to each different fi eld are included in branch regulations of law, we must still 
distinguish the public companies. To be more precise, these are specifi c from 
several aspects, and thus cannot be regarded merely as one separate branch of 
economy.
1.  The Denotation and Classifi cation 
of Publicly-Owned Economic Companies (Public Companies)
When we are examining the enterprises and economic companies owned 
by the state, we must make mention of the privileges of the proprieties as 
of the municipalities (local self-governments). The Basic Law (formerly: 
The Constitution) of Hungary declares it in its article on ‘The Public Finances’ 
that the proprieties of both the state and the municipalities comprise the national 
property.85 The Basic Law, however, declares it separately that the economic 
organizations owned by the state and the municipalities conduct their economy 
in the manner determined by acts of law, independently and responsibly, in 
accordance with the demands imposed by legality, appropriateness, and 
84 See: Decision 59/1991 – Constitutional Court of Hungary.
85 Basic Law Article 38. paragraph (1).
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productivity.86 The municipalities hold a privileged position in the Hungarian 
constitutional settlement,87 and the same applies to their property as well. 
Consequently, in the Hungarian legal terminology, when we use the term 
‘state property’ as a synonym to ‘public property’, in the used (fi rst) term 
the municipality’s property is unentailed. In case we intend to use the term 
consistently, then we must say in every instance ‘the property of the state and 
of the municipalities’ altogether. For the rest of the study, we shall use the 
term ‘public company’, by which we shall mean economic companies operating 
through either state- or a municipality’s shareholding.88
State proprietorship in general distorts the freedom of economic competition 
anyway, the consequences of which in economics have been common. Yet, at the 
same time, the degree of the presence of the state among economic organizations 
is certainly a matter of public politics’ decision-making.89 In this regard, according 
to the Hungarian regulations of law in effect, from a civil-law perspective and 
in terms of the relation between the state and economic companies, we can 
essentially differentiate between the following three types of state presence. 
The fi rst case scenario is when the state runs an economic company or is a 
shareholder in a strategic type of economic company.90 From this, the next case 
scenario separates, in which the state presence is needful, whereby it partakes 
in the economic vitality, which is in other words: the fi eld of public services/
utilities. Here, the state presence does not require any proof or justifi cation, 
unlike the reason why these should operate in the form of economic companies.91 
In our view, these do not necessarily need to operate as economic companies for 
there are such (typically of public-law) legal-subject categories available, the 
application of which leads to the achievement of the aimed target. The dissimilar 
third case scenario category involves companies with peculiar public-law 
relevance, status such as Hungary’s central bank, The Hungarian National Bank 
(MNB).92 The Hungarian National Bank is a legal entity, operating in the form of 
a joint-stock (public) company.93 In our view, the Hungarian National Property 
Management plc (MNV Zrt.) falls into the same category as well, which is a one-
man joint-stock (public) company founded by the state, and the stock of which 
86 Basic Law Article 38. paragraph (5).
87 Basic Law Article 31.
88 On this terminology, see Act No 2009. CXX. 1. § a) point.
89 For instance, the banking sector or the energy industry regarded like that.
90 The Magyar Villamos Művek Zrt. is an example of that, the share of the state in the banking 
sector.
91 Transport corporations, service provider corporations.
92 Basic Law Article 41, Act No 2013. CXXXIX.
93 Act No 2013. CXXXIX. paragraph 5. §, yet the same Act includes prescriptions different from 
general civil law regulations, for instance: ‘plc’ does not need to be indicated in the name of the 
company and the public company does not need to be registered in the company registry. Act 
No 2013. CXXXIX. point 5. § (2).
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is non-negotiable.94 The Hungarian National Property Management plc pursues 
state service, among others, executes proprietary rights over the state fortune.95
However, the realization of the general prescriptions of civil law varies with 
respect to each one of the scenarios, and in fact the specifi c prescriptions affect 
relevant elements of the regulation; in the latter case of the MNB and the MNV Zrt., 
the prescriptions of civil law become restrained, while the specifi c prescriptions 
cover the operation exhaustively.
This classifi cation is theoretical, yet this question does have an outstanding value 
in Hungary. Following the monolithic form of state property before the change of 
regime in 1989, it was necessary a transformation into business-property of the state 
in the framework of the public companies.96 After the privatization in progress at the 
time of the change of regime, and also in the 1990s, the management of state property 
developed into its form known today. Thus, the organization for the management of 
state property has been created: both the Hungarian National Property Management 
plc (MNV Zrt.) and the municipalities can establish economic companies, certainly 
with the purpose of completing public assignment.97 The state property can also be 
broken down into several constituents, a part of which makes the property of the 
state in the form of economic shareholding. Here the state can hold either minority 
or majority proprietorship. Both the management and the administration of this are 
treated by the MNV Zrt. Regarding its set-up, the MNV Zrt. treats nearly 550 shares, 
279 are active companies, 270 are in majority state proprietorship.98 As regards the 
municipalities, no such aggregate data are available.
VI. The Directive Rules of Public Companies
As regards the regulation, it can be generally concluded that to these companies 
also it is the Civil Code, and not the norms regulating the public companies, that 
are to be applied in general.99 So, in this case, there is no difference. The specifi c 
prescriptions are to be found in the term of property management, included in 
the Act of Law on National Property, the Act of Law on State Property, and the 
Act of Law on the Local Self-Governments of Hungary. These acts of law regulate 
the terms and conditions of founding economic companies in general. Specifi c 
prescriptions apply to the organization structure, upon the basis of the directives 
of the Act of Law as per 2009. CXXII. This regulates the possible size of the board 
94 Act No 2007. CVI. point 18. § (1).
95 Act No 2007. CVI. point 17. § (1) c).
96 For more details, see: Sárközy 2012.
97 On this, see: Act No 2011. CLXXXIX. point 41. § (8).
98 www.mnvzrt.hu.
99 For instance, Act No 2006. V. on corporate law regulations or Act No 1991. IL. also including the 
liquidation procedure rules.
43Group Interest in Hungary
of directors and the board of supervisors, and from a corporate governance angle 
the framework of the remuneration system has been set. To conclude, we can 
state that the provision of any public services may be realized in accordance with 
the general (Civil Code) regulations and the specifi c prescriptions applicable as a 
directive only to the organization.
The concern (group) situation disclosed in previous chapters may just as well 
be realized in various forms: examples are presented regarding contractual100 
concern. To the running of these, as well as to their internal regulation scheme, 
the general rules analysed in the fi rst part of the present study are also applicable.
By examining the practice besides the applicable rules, we can draw a conclusion 
as follows. Decision-making for the group operation takes place on a public 
policy stage, and thus our present conclusions touch upon the system in force 
at the time of writing this study. In the fi elds of public utility services, there are 
active concerns (holdings) operating in the form of public limited companies like: 
Hungarian Electricity Works plc (Magyar Villamos Művek Zrt.), which as a group 
integrates nearly 20 separate economic companies through a control contract. 
Merging the state public utility services into one unifi ed system started with the 
foundation of The First National Public Utility Service Provider plc (Első Nemzeti 
Közműszolgáltató Zrt.). A similar concern situation can be observed within the 
transport section, the Budapest Transport Centre plc (Budapesti Közlekedési 
Központ Zrt.), which fulfi ls the task of controlling the transport activities of the 
capital through the simultaneous joint governing of several companies. Volán 
Association (Volán Egyesülés) also operates within the transport sector, the 
associate companies of which are service providers of bus transportation operating 
in different regions of the country.101 The municipalities – in the capital and 
primarily in the cities of county level (e.g. Miskolc, Pécs) – run city management 
holdings. 
VII.  Is There a Specifi c Group Interest 
in Public Companies?
Examining these companies, we can draw the following conclusions from the 
point of view of group interest. In the case of city management holdings, it is a 
typical organizational model to operate with a unifi ed central purchasing system, 
a fi nance and a management system, and that they also follow a unifi ed HP-
100 MVM (Hungarian Electricity Works).
101 For instance: DAKK Zrt., ÉNYKK Zrt. (Hungarian regional transport centre companies in the 
form of plc-s).
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policy; in other words, the parent company conducts the full range of the human 
actions of such companies. These are arranged and performed by the company 
on a group level. The control agreements include the right for the withdrawal 
of authority, that is: ‘the directorate of the controlling company has the right 
to withdraw any authority – either occasionally or permanently – from the 
management of the company under control, by its unilateral written statement 
and with immediate effect, in which case the action executed by the directorate 
of the controlling company through withdrawn authority, the thus concluded 
provision or exerted order directly obliges the company under control along with 
its employees’.102 As part of the proper operation subject to the unifi ed business 
interest, the leading offi cial of the company under control is obliged to carry 
out the management of the Company-under-Control in accordance with point 
No 3:55. in § (4) of the Civil Code (Ptk.) upon the basis set by the priority of the 
ultimate business interest of the acknowledged group of companies as a whole.103
Considering the above shown examples and organizational models, it can be 
declared that in the case of Hungarian public companies it is not unfamiliar, 
however – in many cases, it has been a successfully implemented legal solution 
–, to function as an acknowledged group of companies. The legal framework of 
this is presented by the regulations of public law, on the one hand, and those 
of the Civil Code, on the other. Ever since the Hungarian change of regime, it 
has been a frequent subject of ongoing public policy debates how to effi ciently 
arrange the public services of the state and what kind of optimal model can be 
devised relating to the private entrepreneur’s property of the state.
Both the above cases and the areas examined in the previous chapters show 
that in the case of public companies, regarding group-level functioning, both the 
regulations of civil law as well as corporate law are eligibly applicable. At the 
same time, the doubts disclosed therein, the argued standpoints present in the 
practice of law interpretations and jurisprudence are all still valid. Neither can 
it be nor shall it be necessary to segment the group interest in public companies. 
Hereby, we refer to the fact that some judiciary decisions fundamental to 
universal and not sectorial regulations (e.g. EBD 2013. P. 3.) are also related to 
public companies.
Nevertheless, as to our view, from one perspective, group interest does 
manifest differently from general regulations. The group-like cooperation of 
market players depicts a group interest that can be separated from the interests of 
102 Pécs Holding City Property management plc publicized draft on control contract, point: 4.2.1.1. 
Available at: www.pecsholding.hu.
103 Ibid.: 4.3.2.2. point, and also Miskolc Holding Municipality Property Management plc 
foundation deed point: 15.3.
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the controlling company. Yet, it completely fi ts into the market players’ system of 
interest (economic companies).
This interest, however, bears a different meaning in public companies. 
The interest of the controlling company must typically – or ideally – fall in line 
with the public interest. This public interest is manifested in the organization 
that manages the proprietorship rights, and also in the status of the proprietor. In 
the case of the Hungarian National Property Management Company (MNV Zrt.), 
it is the parliament and government in power who bears the responsibility for 
making decisions along certain property policies. Behind the decisions of the 
holdings owned by the municipalities, there is the board of representatives, or, 
more precisely, the decision-making body who were granted legitimacy at the 
elections. This point of connection does not only explain the different content 
of the group interest but the identifi cation of the group interest with the public 
interest as well. In our view, the question resulting from this is to what extent 
making any references to the public interest covers the group interest and to what 
extent the current regulation on group-level cooperation as prescribed by the 
Civil Code (Ptk.) can be applied to the relations of public companies with such 
peculiarities.
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